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Abstract 
The question of this paper follows an empirical study carried out from 2013 to 2015 in five EU countries. The 
paper looks for a method by which empirical statements can be comprehensibly generalized.The answer is 
given before a methodological-constructive background. Empirical statements about persons and events are 
an integral part of the concept. However these statements serve to form input hypotheses. In order to decide 
the hypotheses, the linguistic means must be provided. In Methodical Constructivism, the general occurs in 
language as the generality of a predicator. Predication is the place where the relationship between individual 
and universal can be developed. The concept is based on a process called "dialogical training of experience". 
With its help, characteristics can be assigned to persons methodically secured; the syntax and semantics of a 
science language can be provided as an interpreted formal language; and transitions from particular to gener-
al empirical assertions can be established.  
Keywords: About epistemological foundations of the empirical social sciences; introducing the terms “the 
unfamiliar”, “everyday experience”, “scientific experience”, “dialogue”; the concept of constructive elimination 
induction; the aim to come from particularistic self-presentation to universal understanding. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the years from 2013 to 2015 an EU study has been carried out in Germany, Finland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden 
(Krope and Petersen 2015). The Center for Constructive Educational Science at the University of Kiel was involved in 
the project. The subject of the study titled "Domestic Violence Met by Educated Women" was domestic violence against 
women. One of the objectives was to formulate reliable recommendations on how domestic violence should be avoided, 
mitigated or stopped. As a prerequisite for intervention measures, a questionnaire survey had been carried out in the 
participating countries. 
In the course of the study doubts about the questionnaire have been expressed. The questionnaire was developed by the 
Kiel group. The question was how it would be possible to make interpersonal comprehensible statements on acts in the 
EU countries outside Germany as well as outside the perception and the values of the research team. 
The conversation between two persons, who had been beaten in domestic conflicts, gave rise to the criticism. One of the 
persons appealed to the Istanbul Convention. The Convention is entitled "The Council of Europe Convention on prevent-
ing and combating violence against women and domestic violence". The agreement is a treaty under international law, 
which entered into force on 1 August 2014 and creates binding legal norms. The other person referred to the past of their 
community, which is still alive in their family association. Those who ask questions about their tradition and formulate 
objections are not welcome. The familiar bonds, which belong to the protective stock, are defended. Blows in the 
domestic frame are regarded as an act of recognition. Through the beatings, the beaten person can return to the family. 
The conversation was characterized by a reciprocal rejection of the opponent's remarks. If two persons have experienced 
beatings in the domestic sphere, and cannot share the experience of the others, then there are epistemologically relevant 
questions. Is an experience basically only for the person who has made this experience himself? Is there a methodically 
assured transition from particular empirical statements to general empirical statements in the empirical sciences? Under 
which conditions is an experience accessible for scientists outside the culture within which a person has made this 
experience? Can statements be reproduced outside a culture? 
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2. The Unfamiliar (Fremdes) 
The methodological-constructive dialogue forms the basis for answering questions on argument theory, which are related 
to the logical connection of elementary statements. A dialogue in the dialogic logic is a dispute that follows explicitly 
defined rules around an initial statement (a hypothesis) that ends with a decision after finitely many steps. The initial 
statement is (formally) true if a (formal) profit strategy exists in its favor; otherwise it is wrong. 
In the version of the Methodical Constructivism developed by Kuno Lorenz, on the basis of the dialogue, relationships 
between persons can be described as a relation between one's own (Eigenem) and the unfamiliar (Fremdem). In this 
approach, "unfamiliar" is a two-place predicator, which is attributed to two persons (or groups of persons) who follow 
different generic acts (Handlungsschemata), each with incompatible purposes. 
In his essay “Das Eigene und das Fremdeim Dialog” ("The Own and the Unfamiliar in Dialogue"), which was developed 
within the lecture "How do We Understand the Unfamiliar ? "Lorenz,  (2005) describes four typical patterns of an 
encounter between persons. The first pattern is the demarcation, which is based on demolition. "At least one side wants to 
have as little as possible contact with the other side after a first confrontation or after a long unsuccessful attempt to 
approach it" (Lorenz,  2005, 142). The second of the four patterns of an encounter between persons is the assimilation, in 
which the unfamiliar is included in the own. In the third place, Lorenz,  mentions the accommodation. According to 
Lorenz,, the ownwill be taken over from the unfamiliar point of view. Assimilation and accommodation are mirror 
images. As a fourth type of relationship between persons, Lorenz,  determines the form of a dialogical confrontation, "in 
which the dealing with one's own self and with the unfamiliar is developed, and one is not content with distinguishing 
one's own from others. It is a question of looking for something new, an untrustworthy one of the 'reflection level' – as 
one says, referring to oneself, –, in particular of developing a new speech of one's own and the unfamiliar in regard to 
what in the first place has been called „own‟ and „unfamiliar‟” (Lorenz 2005, 146). In the encounter with the unfamiliar, 
the dialogue is open to the unexpected, to the new. 
Language construction is begun in the Methodical Constructivism with an act that ensures that it is understood. In the 
simplest case, this is a gesture with which something is shown. This very special act is referred to as "showing gesture" 
(Zeigehandlung). This "something", which is shown, is called "object" for the simplification of the speech. In the case of 
an advanced understanding of the language, the showing gesture can be accompanied by words selected from the 
everyday language such as "That is ...". The use of the expression is practiced by way of example and counter-example. 
In this process words are assigned to the objects. These words are called "predicators." The process is called 
"predication". 
In the preceding description the conversation of two persons who had experienced domestic blows was sketched. Both 
have encountered something unfamiliar in this conversation. The one person, to the surprise of the other, describes 
domestic blows as violence. The second one calls domestic beats an act of recognition, on which, in turn, the first is 
alien. The question of whether the predicator "violence" or the predicator "recognition" is rightly attributed to an object 
(domestic beating) can be taken as the point of departure for a dispute that can be decided in a dialogue by rules: Namely 
with question and answer, with speech and reply, with claims and contests, with actions and reactions, with learning and 
teaching, with attack and defense. In the course of the discussion, one side makes a proposal that the other side can 
accept, reject, or replace by an alternative. Predication is the place where the relationship between one's own and the 
unfamiliar can be developed dialogically. 
3. Everyday Experience 
What does "experience" mean? In the continuation of the work of Kambartel (1976), Lorenzen,  (1987, 43 – 44 and 269) 
and Mittelstraß (1980), an everyday and a social-scientific concept of experience is distinguished. The concept of 
everyday experience is introduced as follows with reference to the terms "act" (Handlung) and "happening” 
(Widerfahrnis). 
In the chapter "Politische Anthropologie" of his textbook, Lorenzen (1987, 243 – 244) introduces the concept of the act 
in distinction, above all from the concept of the behavior as follows. Let someone follow a call like "Bring me this 
book!" This act signifies Lorenzen as "compliance with a call" or shorter as "act". For the use of the concept of the act it 
is irrelevant whether the request is made by the person acting himself or by another person. "Act" is an activity that is 
subject to a purpose. The acting person wants to raise, maintain or avoid a situation. But whether or not a doing is anact 
cannot be determined by pure observation, but only within the limits of an interpretation. 
In his "Philosophische Anthropologie" Kamlah (1973) introduces eight rules for the use of the predicator "happening" 
(Widerfahrnis). (1) The grammatical terms "active" and "passive" can be used to distinguish between "act" and 
"happening". The waiter serves the guest – he acts. The guest is served by the waiter –it happens to him 
(eswiderfährtihm) to be served by the waiter. (2) A happening can be caused by people, for example, when someone 
loves someone, hates, hurts. If an acting person cannot be held responsible, it is said "something happens to us", such as a 
car accident, a disease or a lottery profit. (3) "Happening" is a two-place predicator. It is said, "Something is happening to 
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someone". If one does not know what is happening, then it is said "something happens", for example "it rains". (4) 
Something can happen to a single person or group of people. (5) "Even when we act, something always happens to us. 
There is a happening without act, but there is no pure act. [...] acts lead to success or failure or even unexpected 
consequences" (Kamlah 1973, 35). (6) Kamlah refers the term "happening" to human need. "Nothing happens to a stone, 
even not toa device" (Kamlah 1973, 36). (7) The term "happening" is not limited to events, but also refers to conditions 
and processes. (8) Examples of actsare counter-examples for happeningsand vice versa. 
With regard to the term "happening" introduced by Kamlah, it is said: "Everyday experience" is a skill that requires a 
happening. This skill consists in the ability to be safely familiar with something: a craftsman training that is happened to 
a person creates a system of goals and rules of acts for that person. A further result is the ability to master 
discriminations: the pupil of music, whom happened a good teaching in harmony, can make a conceptual distinction and 
say: "This is a minor third, that one is a great third." And if a lesson with a jazz musician happened to him as an accepted 
model, then he can make pragmatic distinctions between the binary and the ternary way of playing, without any explicit 
rules of acts or predicators being available to him. Finally, this ability is the knowledge of the particular: a person whom 
happenschemotherapy can cite those aspects which, from their point of view, belong to the painful concomitant 
circumstances and are not available to a reader who is exclusively informed about the general therapy. 
The ability is subject to limitations in two ways. First, it is elementary, since it is based on finitely many examples and 
counter-examples. This limits the generalization of the experience that a person has made in everyday life. When to a 
young man happens the bitter ending of his first love, his generalizing conclusion ("So are all women") has not a 
convincing prognostic validity. Secondly, everyday experience does not say anything about causes. A saxophone player 
who, after years of practice, finally succeeds in the satisfactory intonation of an overtone, cannot be sure why a success 
happened to him; responsible may be the day's best form, the other instrument, the new mouthpiece or an interaction of 
the three conditions. 
4. Experience in the Social Sciences 
What is meant by "experience" in the social sciences? In the social sciences, situations are created in which an act is 
called for. In the process empirical methods are used, such as systematic observation, interview, questionnaire, test and 
experiment. Experiences are gained by the happenings which arise as a result of the required act. 
Paul Lorenzen (1987, 43/44) describes what is meant by a "situation" in the philosophy of science: "A situation should be 
understood as a system of relevant facts [...]. The relevance of circumstances – whether it is a situation or not – is to be 
defined on the basis of assessment criteria, according to which certain circumstances are relevant when they are 
necessary for achieving certain purposes or for solving certain tasks". 
With reference to the methodological and the theoretical level, it is said:"Experience" in the social scientific sense is the 
ability, based on methods and gained through happenings, to formulate statements about different acts in established 
situations and to argue about the relevance of the differences on the basis of determinations or norms that have been 
introduced to establish truth. 
On the one hand, scientists in the field of the empirical sciences are able to produce rationally traceable evidence. In the 
Methodical Constructivism, the production of scientific knowledge proceeds from the constituent, constructive 
perceiving person (Gethmann 2010, 22). On the other hand, the happening is no event that would be worked out and 
understood like a physical experiment, a mathematical operation, or a logical calculus. Something happens to the 
empirical scientist that is not always rational. The empirical contains a remnant which is resistant to philosophy 
(“Mittelstraß” 2010, 10). 
5. Probably 
In an empirical science, that has the unfamiliar as its object probabilistic theory is put to the test with the question 
whether the concept of probability provides a theoretical basis for comprehensible conclusions from the known to the 
unknown. For this discussion the term "probable" is used in the sense of Kolmogoroff. The term "probable" is used in the 
social sciences to calculate the occurrence of future events. 
In 1933, the Soviet mathematician Andrei Nikolajewitsch Kolmogoroff (1933, reprint 1973) presented the draft of an 
axiomatic probability theory. In the preface of his book, which is only about 70 pages long, the scientist describes the 
most important mathematical principles on which he was able to build his work. According to Sachs (1974, 29) Kol-
mogroff combines the concept of probability with modern set theory, measure theory, and functional analysis. For the 
present question, the consequences are two. Firstly, the events on which predictions are to be made can be represented on 
the basis of the set theory. Secondly, the prerequisites are knowledge of the structure of the events in question in the 
sense that the initial and the final state of the events to be described must be calculable. 
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An example for the application of the probability theory is the solution of the two-cube problem. If you play with two 
six-sided dice, then there are 36 possible events, so all possible pairs of eye numbers. The representation in set theory 
(with "E" for "Event") 
E = (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5) (1, 6), (2, 1) … (6, 2), (6, 3), (6, 4), (6, 5) (6, 6) 
Describes in the first bracket the possible event that both cubes display a 1; in the second bracket one cube shows a 1, the 
other a 2, and so on to the 36th bracket in which both cubes show a 6. 
Now the dice players can ask for favorable events. A favorable event can be composed of several possible events. For 
example, if you need the eye sum 8 (your favorable event), you can count that the number of favorable events is 5. In the 
above-mentioned notation, namely, the sum is located in the bracket which is located at the fifth position from the right 
in the eye pair "6, 2". The abridged representation is to be completed in order to find the other four eye sums. Thus the 
dice player calculates the probability (P)  
P (E) = 
 events possible ofnumber 






events possible ofnumber 
events favorable ofnumber 
 . 
Another case: The probability for sums of the eye to be equal to or greater than 2 when playing with two dice is 1,  
namely 




"1" means: there will always be eye sums with two dice equal to 2 or greater 2. Another example: The probability for eye 
numbers less than 2 is 0. With two six-sided cubes, which carry eye numbers from 1 to 6, no eye sums can be obtained 
which are smaller than 2. These probabilities were determined by theoretic considerations for which the theory of 
combinatorics was used. These are mathematical probabilities. 
If the players actually roll the dice and compare the number of favorable events observed relative to the number of 
throws, they are given relative frequencies, which deviate significantly from the mathematical probability in each test. If, 
however, they perform more and more throwing, and the number of their throws approaches infinity, then the 
mathematical and empirical probability according to the probability theory agree: probabilities are determined as limiting 
values of relative frequencies in an infinite series of repeated experiments. 
In the question of the application of the probability theory outside a constructed subject area such as the dice game, the 
conditions formulated by Kolmogroff are relevant. First, the initial state must be known. The fact that the mathematical 
probabilities are known is usually justified by "perfect physical properties" of the materials used (for example, in dicing). 
To avoid a circular definition of “perfect property” Lorenzen introduces the term "repeatability" with reference to the 
sufficiently good technical conditions found in our culture in order to standardize the use in games such as the dice game 
by means of rules: "After the test, the device is again in the same state as before the experiment" (Lorenzen 1987, 218). 
Secondly, the final state of the events must be computable. In general there is the assumption that the sum of a large 
number of values follows asymptotically a stable distribution. 
Rott and Lubbe conclude: "A non-arbitrary numerical probability specification in the sense of the random game presumes 
(apart from the statement of constant general conditions, namely, in the case of which both the occurrence and the non-
occurrence of a questionable event are possible) the non-arbitrary division of the possibility space defined by the given 
conditions into equal possible courses "(Rott and Lubbe 1996, 606). That is, in disciplines that construct their subject 
matter according to a uniform process, it is possible to prove the conclusions from the known to the unknown on the 
basis of the probability theory. Probability theory, however, is unsuitable when the unfamiliar is the object of a theory of 
social science. 
6. Constructive Eliminative Induction 
John Stuart Mill (1882) has developed a theory for the induction of general statements from individual statements, of 
which a component is known as "Eliminative Induction". An overview of the problems associated with this theory is 
given(in an encyclopedic summary) by Haas (1984, 233), (in detail) by PIĘTKA and STACEWICZ (2015), and (with a focus 
on the logical problem) by Von Wright (1957). The concept, which is referred to as "Constructive Eliminative Induction" 
within the scope of the present discussion, consists of a three-part measure. The first part deals with the exclusion of 
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restricted hypotheses, the second deals with the description of the limited validity of non-excluded hypotheses. Part three 
contains the dialogical decision about empirical statements, which are disputed. 
The starting point of the present concept is the methodological basic principle for the planning of empirical investigations 
with the following considerations. If a person or a group of persons to whom something happened is examined only once, 
then the conclusions drawn from such an investigation have almost no scientific value, since they do not allow any 
checks. To ensure a statement, at least one comparison is required. Different objects are to be examined for equality and 
inequality. The ability to discriminate is not, so to speak, empirically given, but designed qua construction in the social-
scientific concept of experience. The observation of isolated objects is inconsequential for this purpose. The controller 
requirement justifies the relevance of the experimental design. In the concept of the Constructive Eliminative Induction 
the hypothesis validity is related to the validity of the empirical investigation. With the validity, a hypothesis is qualified 
as an initial statement for a dialogical decision. 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) present 16 experimental designs, ranging from preliminary designs (including, for example, 
a single questionnaire survey without a comparison case) to real experimental designs (such as the control group 
arrangement with pre- and post-test and random selection) to quasi-experimental designs (such as time series 
experiments). For each of the designs the authors describe the consequences of an inadequate control for the validity of 
the investigation. The distinction is made between inner and outer validity. 
Firstly, to inner validity, which is also referred to as “internal validity”?"An examination is internally valid if its result is 
clearly interpretable. Internal validity is decreasing with an increasing number of plausible alternative explanations for 
the result due to uncontrolled disturbance variables"(Bortz 1993, 8).C Campbell and Stanley describe eight different 
types of disturbance variables that are relevant to the internal validity. These include, for example, changes in the persons 
selected for the investigation. These eight interfering variables can have effects that are mixed with or confused with the 
investigated effect. The interfering variables can be excluded as alternatives for explaining an examination result if they 
are controlled by the test design. Internal validity is the minimum prerequisite without which no empirical investigation 
can be interpreted. 
Outer validity, which is also referred to as "external validity", is the second criterion to be considered when interpreting 
empirical data. "An investigation is externally valid if its outcome is generalizable beyond the particular conditions of the 
investigation situation and beyond the investigated persons. The external validity decreases with increasing unnaturalness 
of the examination conditions or with decreasing representativeness of the examined sample"(Bortz 1993, 8). In 
experiments, according to Campbell and Stanley, four disturbance variables (such as the effects of the experimental 
situation) can affect the external validity of examination results. Generalizations always contain extrapolations, which 
point beyond the past and beyond individual cases. These attempts to generalize are endangered by the four disturbance 
variables. External validity raises the question of the generalizability of the statements which go beyond the subject or 
group of persons, beyond the scope of the investigation and the investigation procedures. 
With regard to the experimental design, the constructive elimination method presented in this paper provides indications 
for dealing with statements about future events and statements about events in unaccountably or indeterminately large 
populations. 
If statements in a group of persons are accepted without contradiction and form the base of acts, there is no need to 
distinguish between those which are to be used later and those who are not to be used. A distinction is required if at the 
same time the statement “A” is also formulated with the statement "non-A". In order to be able to decide which of the 
statements can be used in such a situation, the meta-appredicators "true" and "false" are introduced (Lorenzen 1987, p. 
41). 
Statements are referred to as value-definite whenever a decision between "A is true" and "A is false" can be made and 
defended. If the logical particle "or" is introduced, then value-definite sentences can be said to be either true or false. A 
third is not foreseen in the concept of value-definite statements. Lorenzen (1987, 106 seqq.) introduces the operators of 
the ontic modal logic into situations where it is a question of abolishing the restriction of value-definite statements. 
Lorenzen (1987, 111 – 113) develops the foundations of an ontic modal logic from the speech on the necessity of 
promises of the future, in the light of the fact that recourse to certain knowledge of relative necessities can lead to further 
necessities. The following symbols are used: " " is the definition character, "¬" is the negation sign, and "" is the sign 
for the conjunction. With the help of "necessary" ( ) “possible“( ) is defined by “ A ¬ ¬A” and „contin-
gent“( ) by “ A A¬ A”. In words, "contingent true" is defined as "neither necessarily true nor impossible 
true". Sentences, in which – at least by analogy – the operators "necessary", "contingent" and "impossible" as well as 
their derivations occur, are called "descriptive sentences". These include empirical sentences. 
The meta-appredicator "contingent" is used for empirical sentences, which are determined by an investigation that has at 
least an internal validity, when applying to the future and to the infinite. The assertion that the statement may necessarily 
be true or impossibly be true is not permissible as an opening position for a further investigation, i.e. as a hypothesis of a 
new study to be tested. 
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Part three of the conception developed as "Constructive Eliminative Induction" in the present context consists in deciding 
in a dialogical discussion about empirical statements when these are disputed. The presentation takes up the encounter, 
sketched in the preceding, of two persons who have experienced domestic blows. The first person is called "proponent". 
The proponent starts the consultation with a claim. The proponent can present a hypothesis as a contingent true 
statement. For this he may refer to the Istanbul Convention with a corresponding definition of violence and an internally 
valid empirical investigation based on it. The second person is called "opponent". The opponent begins the consultation 
by disputing the input statement of his dialogue partner. To this end, he can refer to his family tradition and the 
experience gained within his framework and point out that the opponent is not represented at all in the study presented by 
the proponent. 
From the perspective of experimental planning, the debate about "true" and "false" aims at the fact that the proponent has 
submitted an externally non-valid study. The Methodological Constructivism describes an alternative perspective by 
providing, in addition to the classical foundations for truthful statements, a dialogical basis, which only uses dialog-
definite composite sentences – built from empirical elementary sentences (as in the present case) –  and regulates how to 
attack and defend these sentences. At the beginning of the consultation are the proponent's claim and the doubts of the 
opponent. This is followed by a discussion at the end of which the participants conclude. From a participant S1, which 
makes an initial assertion A1, it is said: "S1 asserts that A1", symbolized as "S1 A1". Here,  (for "theory" in the 
Aristotelian sense) refers to descriptive sentences. It is assumed that further assertions (A2... An) Follow, which after a 
reasonable discussion lead to the conclusion B. From a participant S1 who has followed the discussion and agreed to the 
conclusion B, let it be said that he has formed knowledge: "S1 knows that B", symbolically represented as "S1
o
 B". B is 
defined as dialogue-definite, if the dialogue ends (not with a fictional, but) with the actual participation of proponent and 
opponent and in compliance with the dialogical application rules for the reciprocal attacks and defenses (summarized by 
Kamlah and Lorenzen 1973, 209 – 225). 
7. Incompatible Purposes 
In this dialogue, the acts of the proponent and the opponent are subject to purposes incompatible with each other. This 
means that the facts which proponent and opponent each attempt to maintain, or to avoid, cannot be realized at the same 
time. How each of the two person‟s acts to reach their purposes triggers a surprise in the other person. The question of 
whether and how the unfamiliar can be bridged is at the same time a continuation of the search for a method of 
generalizing the individual. 
Statements about purposes are no descriptive, but prescriptive statements. Prescriptive statements say what state of 
affairs shall be. In the foregoing, the modality Δ ("necessary") is introduced. "ΔA" means: "The statement A is 
necessarily true". If the modality Δ is used iterated, then it can be interpreted as a necessity not for present assumptions 
but for future statements. "ΔA" in this case means that A will necessarily be true. Δ in this use is a modality of the 
mellontic modal logic. Finally, Δ of the mellontic modal logic can be interpreted as the obligation of promises of the 
future, connected with apreceding! "Δ! A" means the obligation of a future state of affairs: "The state of affairs A shall 
be". In this interpretation, as a modality of deontic modal logic, Δ can be used in a method for rational decision-making 
about prescriptive statements. 
The method consists, in analogy to the procedure on the descriptive level, to base the principle of the overcoming of the 
subjectivity also on the effort to the justification of prescriptive statements and to call it the principle of transsubjectivity. 
The principle prescribes that, when it comes to the justification of prescriptive statements, every participant in the 
counseling should endeavor not to insist on his subjectively determined purposes with which the counseling begins. 
Beginning with the initial purposes A1... A through rational consultation the decision B arises which is considered 
justified because of its transsubjectiv origin. The principle of transsubjectivity serves as legitimation of a prescriptive 
basic system. It is also the starting point for the argumentative mediation about incompatible purposes. The purposes are 
not yet transsubjective, as long as they are represented only by a particular person. A decision taken on the basis of 
reasonable advice can be used to overcome the incompatibility. Thus it can be said: "The participants agree that decision 
B should be", symbolic: "Si ° B". Where  (for "practice" in the Aristotelian sense) refers to prescriptive statements. 
This legitimate decision is the prescriptive basic statement, from which by logic further prescriptive statements follow. 
The method is that proponent and opponent transform their initial (subjective) prescriptive utterances. They formulate a 
single purpose which fulfills two conditions. Both can agree with it. Everyone recognizes in principle his own, his 
original concern again. This single new purpose represents the ultimate purpose in a multi-level hierarchy of purposes. In 
doing so, the general purpose is the prerequisite for adherence to other purposes, the sub-purposes. Through the 
hierarchization important things can be distinguished from less important ones. Through the establishment of a hierarchy 
of purposes, rational decisions can be made. With reference to the variant of the Methodical Constructivism developed 
by Lorenz (2005), it is said: Initially incompatible purposes are made compatible by revising one's own and the 
unfamiliar at a reflection level. Proponent and opponent invent again what they initially called "own" and "unfamiliar". 
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8. Dialogical Training of Experience  
In several empirical studies, Krope (2006) investigated the ability of adolescents to dissolve transsubjectively the 
incompatibility of purposes by establishing a hierarchy of sub-and super-purposes. To this end, the young people had 
been asked to look for ways out of controversies similar to the moral dilemmas of Lawrence Kohlberg (1994). As a 
result, two prerequisites for success can be established. A solution was more likely to be achieved if, firstly, the intention 
was to reach an amicable communication. The second prerequisite was that the participants were provided with 
methodological support for a teaching and learning process, which was described as "dialogical training of experience ". 
The language is built up in the Methodical Constructivism with examples and counter-examples. The concept of the 
dialogical training of experience is based on an indirect variant of the exemplary definition. The variant is sketched by 
Lorenzen (1987, 179) and executed by Krope (2017). That is the story telling. Fictitious stories can be used for this. The 
stories need nothing to do with reality. In the present case the story begins with a narrative on the central topic of 
"violence" proposed by the proponent, and a narrative that has been put forward by the opponent, which is concentrated 
on "recognition". Proponent and opponent are asked to enumerate a variety of aspects for both narratives, which are 
related to their respective themes from their very own point of view. The expression "from their very own point of view" 
is said to mean that the dialogue partner does not have to share the interpretation at the beginning of the encounter. 
On the level of descriptions the proponent and the opponent have described their own experiences, which they had made 
before the meeting. For the description of the domestic blows, the proponent used the predicator "violence", the opponent 
the predicator "recognition". On the level of objects, however, proponents and opponents, when they have the claim to 
individuality, are unable to say anything about it, because the object is only their object. Individual objects can only be 
named in their case by means of a definite description (Kennzeichnung). For example, they can say, "That, what 
happened on that day at my home". This reference to the individual is not suitable when a comprehensible 
communication is intended. Through the enumeration of the manifold aspects in the narratives, proponents and 
opponents are empowered to a language with which they can communicate with their conversation partners – beyond the 
individual on the level of objects. In order to arrive at an amicable communication, they will determine the general 
between the stories. In doing so, unequal objects of the different narratives are equated. By abstraction there is a 
transition from an inequality to an equality and thus from an individual to a general. In his Oxford lectures, Lorenzen 
(1969, 73f.) describes the analysis of factual genesis and normative genesis as two principles serving the generalization. 
What is meant by this is the step-by-step understanding of the historical and cultural emergence of a purpose, which 
represents a dialogue partner in a current debate. Based on this, the question is asked whether, under the changed current 
conditions, the purpose in question can be justified or need revaluation. If the process of generalization is successfully 
completed, the conversation round can come to an understanding upon new, shared experiences.  
9. Conclusions 
The central question of this paper follows an empirical study carried out from 2013 to 2015 in five Eu countries. The 
question touches on the epistemological foundations of the empirical social sciences. It is: "Is there a methodically 
assured transition from particular empirical statements to general empirical statements in the empirical social sciences?" 
The paper looked for a method by which empirical statements can be comprehensibly generalized. 
Whoever takes the natural sciences as model is classifying the particular into comprehensive contexts on the basis of 
probabilities. According to the natural sciences, a single event is recorded as an objective fact. It is classified into a 
probabilistic law, which is supposed to enable a secure action. 
The answer to the question, which is given in this paper before a methodological-constructive background, is to be 
distinguished from the natural science-oriented answer. The empirical statements about persons and events are also an 
integral part of the latter. But these statements serve to form input hypotheses. In order to decide the hypotheses, the 
linguistic means must be provided. In Methodical Constructivism, the general occurs in language as the generality of a 
predicator. Predication is the place where the relationship between individual and universal can be developed. 
How do the two paradigms differ? The method of the natural sciences is based on the probability theory of Kolmogroff   
The Soviet mathematician introduced the set theory, the measure theory, and functional analysis as its most important 
mathematical foundations. The application of probability theory presupposes, therefore, that mathematical laws are rec-
ognized as the world ruling principles of universalization. The individual cases are classified into these laws. - The con-
cept of the Methodical Constructivism is based on a process called "dialogical training of experience". With its help, 
characteristics can be assigned to persons methodically secured; the syntax and semantics of a science language can be 
provided as an interpreted formal language; and transitions from particular to general empirical assertions can be estab-
lished. In the language construction described as "dialogical training of experience" the persons involved in the process 
are not only the addressees, but also the authors of rules and abstractions. The dialogical training of experience is a 
teaching and learning process with the aim to come from particularistic self-presentation to universal understanding. 
 
 
Journal of  Progressive Research in Social Sciences (JPRSS)                                                                                                                                                                      
ISSN: 2395-6283                                                                                                                                               
 
Volume 5, Issue 1 available at www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jprss                                                                                 345 
References 
[1] Bortz, J. (1993). Statistik. Für Sozialwissenschaftler.4thed.Berlin etc.: Springer. 
[2] Campbell, D. T., Stanley, J. C.(1963).Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research. Reprint from 
Handbook of Research on Teaching. Boston etc.: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
[3] Gethmann, C. F. (2010).Die Aktualität Methodischen Denkens.In Gethmann, C. F., “Mittelstraß”, J. (Eds.). Paul 
Lorenzen zu Ehren. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 15 – 37.  
[4] HAAS, G. (1984). Induktion. In “Mittelstraß”, J. (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie. 
Volume 2. Mannheim etc.: B.I.-Wissenschaftsverlag, 232 – 234. 
[5] Kambartel, F. (1976). Apriorische und empirische Elemente im methodischen Aufbau der Physik. In Bohme, G. 
(ed.). Protophysik: Für und wider eine konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie der Physik. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 
351 – 371.  
[6] Kamlah, W. (1973): Philosophische Anthropologie. Sprachliche Grundlegung und Ethik. Mannheim etc.: B.I.-
Wissenschaftsverlag. 
[7] Kamlah, W., Lorenzen, P. (1973): Logische Propädeutik. Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens. 2nd ed. Mannheim 
etc.: B.I.-Wissenschaftsverlag. 
[8] Kohlberg, L. (1994).Die Psychologie der Moralentwicklung. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 
[9] Kolmogroff   , A.N. (1973). Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Reprint. Berlin etc.: Springer. 
[10] Krope, P. (2006). Podstawy etyczne pomiaru dydaktycznego (Ethical Bases of Educational Measurement). In 
Niemierko, B., Szmigel, M. K. (eds.). O Wyższą Jakość Egzaminów Szkolnych. Krakau: Polskie Towarzystwo 
Diagnostyki Edukacyjnej, 25–38. 
[11] Krope, P. (2017). From the Narration of Violence to the Definition of Violence.Kiel (unpublished). 
[12] Krope, P., Petersen, J. P. (eds.) (2015). Wege aus der Gewalt? Eine Studie im europäischen Rahmen über häusliche 
Gewalt gegen Frauen. Münster/New York: Waxmann. 
[13] Lorenzen, K. (1980).Dialog. In “Mittelstraß”, J. (Ed.). Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie. 
Volume 1. Mannheim etc.: B.I.-Wissenschaftsverlag, 471 – 472. 
[14] Lorenz, K. (2005). Das Eigene und das Fremde im Dialog. In Rusterholz, P., MOSER, R.(eds.). Wie verstehen wir 
Fremdes? Bern etc.: Peter Lang, 137 – 154.  
[15] Lorenz, K. (2011). Epilog: Das dialogische Prinzip. In Lorenz, K. Philosophische Variationen. Gesammelte 
Aufsätze unter Einschluss gemeinsam mit Jürgen “Mittelstraß” geschriebener Arbeiten zu Platon und Leibniz. 
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 509 – 519. 
[16] Lorenzen, P. (1969).Normative LogicandEthics. Mannheim/Zürich: Bibliographisches Institut. 
[17] Lorenzen, P. (1987). Lehrbuch der konstruktiven Wissenschaftstheorie. Mannheim etc.: B.I.-Wissenschaftsverlag. 
[18] Mill, J. S.(1882). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of 
Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. 8
th
 ed. London: Harper & Brothers. 
[19] “Mittelstraß”, J. (1980). Erfahrung. In “Mittelstraß”, J. (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie. 
Volume 1. Mannheimetc.:B.I.-Wissenschaftsverlag, 568 – 571. 
[20] “Mittelstraß”, J. (2010). Feier zur Gründung der Paul Lorenzen-Stiftung. Einführung. In Gethmann, C. F., “Mittel-
straß”, J. Paul Lorenzen zu Ehren. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 9 – 14. 
[21] Pietka, D., StacewiczP. (2015).A Decision Logic Approach to Mill‟s Eliminative Pietka Induction. In: Studies in 
Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric. 4 (55), 113 – 138. 
[22] Rott, H., Lubbe, W. (1996). Wahrscheinlichkeit. In “Mittelstraß”, J. (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie und 
Wissenschaftstheorie. Volume 4. Stuttgart/Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 605 – 612.  
[23] Sachs, L. (1974). Angewandte Statistik. Planung und Auswertung. Methoden und Modelle.4th ed. Berlin etc.: 
Springer. 
[24] Wright, G. H. VON (1957).The LogicalWright Problem of Induction.2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
 
Journal of  Progressive Research in Social Sciences (JPRSS)                                                                                                                                                                      
ISSN: 2395-6283                                                                                                                                               
 
Volume 5, Issue 1 available at www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jprss                                                                                 346 
Author’s Biography 
 
Prof. Dr. Peter Krope, born in 1940, studied Latin, physical education, science of education, 
psychology, sociology, professor at the Institute of Educational Sciences, University of Kiel, 
domains of interest are research theories and research methods in the social sciences and the 
Methodical Constructivism, retired in 2005, continued to work in the Center for Constructive 
Educational Science in an interdisciplinary research team with 40 years of tradition, current book 
publications: http://www.waxmann.com/autor100994. 
 
